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ABSTRACT
Small firnis are comparatively resource disadvantaged when it comes to competing against
scale-oriented competitors. However, one area where small firms may have a digerential
advantage is in building and nurturing highly personalized cusiomer relationships. Drawing
on extant work in external market, internal hierarchical, and internal clan coordinating
mechanisms, we conceptualize an additional coordinating mechanism — the
extraorganizational clan, and hypothesize iis relationship to small firm performance. We test
our hypothesis, linking extraorganizational clan-building and firm performance, on a sample
of over 300 sniall retail firms. Our findings show that selected aspecis of clan-building
behaviors have a positive effect on small firm performance. We conclude by reflecting on
what our findings suggest for sustainable small firm competitive advantage.
Although the impression policy makers [of large retail chains] may wish to instill is
one of a "friendly neighborhood store where the workers know the customers
names," the reality is that Safeway and Wal-Mart are not small corner stores...
- S. Schnoor(1998)
Small firms are resource impoverished entities (Welsh & White, 1981). This reality is not
necessarily problematic, however, unless they compete against larger, resource-advantaged
competitors. But what if this is the case? What can small firms do to create market otTerings
that are perceived by customers as sufficiently rare, valuable, inimitable and nonsubstitutable
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(Barney, 1991)? Schoor's opening quotation suggests one point of contrast —personal
relationships. Such social capital (Burt, 1997) qualifies as neither a physical nor
organizational resource, but can nonetheless be an important point for interfirm differentiation
(Goodwin & Bremler, 1996). Given the unique conditions under which such friendship-
enriched relationships evolve, they can also be highly resistant to superficial imitation.
However, could such personalized relationships be a basis for superior small firm
performance? This article considers this possibility. It begins by exploring how nurturing
personal relationships contributes to a small firm's legitimacy and thereby contributes to its
perfomiance. We then report our study testing this hypothesis. After describing our
instrument development and data collection methodologies, we explain the operationalizations
of the variable set used in our regression analysis. We then report results from our analysis.
We conclude with a discussion of what our findings suggest for small business researchers
and practitioners alike.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Dimensions of Organization: Technical, Managerial, Institutional
In 1960, Talcott Parsons proposed a tri-dimensional conceptualization of organization. He
asserted that every organization operates in no less than three dimensions: technical,
managerial, and institutional. Whereas the first two dimensions are concerned with the
advantages accruing from intraorganizational expertise and interorganizational resource
flows, the institutional level's focus is on the underlying legitimacy of the organization in its
particular societal context. Parsons proposes that the institutional level is qualitatively
different from both of the previous dimensions in two important ways. First, it operates at a
more basic and fundamental level than either the technical or managerial. He writes,
...just as a technical organization (at a suRiciently high division of labor) is
controlled and 'serviced'y a managerial organization, so, in turn, is the
managerial organization controlled by the 'institutional'tructure and
agencies of the community. (Parsons, 1960:64)
This suggests that the institutional dimension is foundational in nature; while the firm may be
able to achieve temporary advantage based on technical expertise or managerial alliances,
without adequate societal assent the firm will be unable to secure sustainable advantage. The
second distinctive characteristic concerns the nature of the firm's accountability to its
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Compared to the two previous dimensions, the institutional
dimension is measured by far more implicit and subtle criteria. While the technical dimension
is measured by the criterion of accuracy, and the managerial dimension is assessed by the
standards relevant to resource procurement, institutional effectiveness is evaluated by the
often less explicit, but potentially no less significant, criteria governing social exchange.
While these include such concrete codifications as the rules of law, they are also heavily
influenced by "standards of 'good practice'nformally accepted" (Parsons, 1960:65).
The Small Firm and Community Nichemanship
All businesses must satisfy institutional demands. While these have been shown to vary
across different industry settings (Hirsch, 1975), all firms remain accountable within their
particular environmental context. The context of the small firm is distinctive, however,
because of its oRen more localized geographic domain. This suggests that the institutional
challenge facing small firms consists of securing the support and approval of its immediate
surrounding community. While such support may be secured by satisfying the nonrelational
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needs of its community through offering technical expertise and realizing efficiency-
enhancing network involvements, the consent of the local community of customers may also
be fueled as much or more by social considerations. Thompson, Smith and Hood (1993)
provide empirical support for this assertion. Their study documents the extent to which small
firms seek to gain community approval through cash and in-kind charitable contributions and
local involvements.
However, there is at present a discernible gap concerning the nature of community-based
niche creation. Overlooking this aspect of a small firm's existence is understandable;
compared to the more observable and codifiable dimensions of expert service and formal
network alliances, social involvement seems comparatively vague and ill-defined. However it
may be that small firm performance is determined as much, or more, by extraorganizational
relationships than the impersonal attributes of iniraorganizational expertise or
inierorganizational efficiency. More specifically, to the extent the small firm has effectively
institutionalized its vital interests in the social fabric of its surrounding community it has
successfully realized a community-based niche from which to operate.
Conceptualizing Community Nichemanship as Extraorganizational Clan Building
Granovetter's work (1985) on social embeddedness focuses on the nature and importance of
relational dimensions in interfirm transacting behavior. According to Granovetter,
relationships aid in interfirm purchasing decisions because they provide cost-effective, trust-
based information that is "richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate" (Granovetter,
1985: 490). The phenomenon of social embeddedness suggests that continuing economic
transactions often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of
trust and abstention from opportunism" (Granovetter, 1985:490). Integration of Granovetter's
insight with Williamson's (1975, 1985) work on the pursuit of transactional efficiency
suggests the possibility of relationally enriched market transactions requiring more modal
variation than allowed by simple spot contracting. Commenting on the inadequacies of
traditional economic theory, Williamson notes that it "...misses such [relational]
considerations because it assumes that individuals regard transactions in a strictly neutral,
instrumental manner" (1975:38). Lending further support to the need for variation in market
contracting modes, Williamson also observed that:
...it may be more accurate, and sometimes even essential, to regard the
exchange process itself as an object of value. Concern for atmosphere tends
to raise such systems issues; supplying a satisfying exchange relarion is
made part of the economic problem, broadly construed. (Williamson, 1975:
38)
Clearly, a more inclusive perspective, more appreciative of the relational nuances inherent in
market transacting, appears justified.
A suitable cornerstone upon which to conceptualize such a relationally-enriched contracting
alternative comes from Ouchi's (1980) work on organizational clans. His effort extended
Williamson's (1975) markets and hierarchies framework by proposing a third coordinating
mechanism, the intraorganizational clan. According to Ouchi, clans are notably different from
both markets and hierarchies in several important ways. Whereas markets rely on hard and
formal spot contracting, the contracting process of the intraorganizational clan can be
characterized as soft, informal, and perpetual. Collaborating with Williamson, Ouchi noted
that:
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Under hard contracting, the parties remain relatively autonomous, each is
expected to press his or her interests vigorously, and contracting is relatively
complete. SoR contracting, by contrast, presumes much closer identity of
interest between the parties, and formal contracts are much less complete.
(Williamson and Ouchi, 1981:361)
A second distinctive characteristic of the clan is its reduced emphasis on specific knowledge
and procedure and a concomitant increase in emphasis on shared value orientations. As
Alvesson and Lindkvist's (1993) conceptualization of economic cooperative, social-
integrative, and blood-kinship clans suggests, clans provide qualitatively different value-
oriented payoffs for its participants than impersonal bureaucratic structures. Rather, as
Bernard (1938) has argued, clan compensation comes in the form of relational aAirmation
akin to comradeship and communion:
The most intangible and subtle of incentives is that which I have called the
condition of communion. It is related to social compatibility, but is
essentially different. It is the feeling of personal comfort in social relations
that is sometimes called solidarity, social integration, the gregarious instinct,
or social security...It is the opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support
in personal attitudes. (Barnard, 1938: 148)
If internal organizational structures can be more completely understood by the inclusion of a
relational component, examination of that component in the external linkages of organizations
may be equally illuminating. More specifically, by integrating a bi-modal conceptualization
of transaction mode (as relational or non-relational) with a correspondingly coarse-grained
conceptualization of transaction arena (as either internal or external to the organization) four
types of transactions emerge. Three of the four are readily familiar: the external market, the
internal hierarchy and the internal clan. However, a fourth, namely the external, or
extraorganizational, clan, also emerges (Figure I).
The extraorganizational clan results from integration of Ouchi's appreciation for the soft,
informal, interactions motivated by subtle, but powerful, payoffs of intraorganizational
comradeship, with Granovetter's insights into interfirm relationship-based transacting
occurring outside the borders of the formal organization. The extraorganizational clan
represents transactions that occur between parties for whom trust is maximized and
opportunism is minimized.
Conceptual Support for The Extraorganizational Clan
Social theory on community (Weber, 1964; Bender, 1978) provides conceptual support for the
extraorganizational clan construct. While there is a substantial lack of definitional consensus
on the precise meaning of community, there is general agreement that it concerns "a network
of social relations marked by mutuality and emotional bonds" (Bender, 1978: 7). In addition,
there is also consensus that community is not inherently site-specific. Rather, as Bender has
written, community is better understood "as an experience than as a place" (1978:6).
Community arises to provide social texture to the lives of those that participate in its
formation and ongoing maintenance. Community's conceptual distance from the impersonal
spirit of neo-classical spot market contracting was clarified by Weber (1964) who considered
a relationship communal if its orientation was predicated on "a subjective feeling of the
parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together" (1964: 136). Communal
relationships stand in stark contrast to what Weber defined as associative relationships, that
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FIGURE I:THE EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CLAN
Intraorganizational Extraorganizational
Relational Clan Clan
(Ouchi, 1980) (EOC)
Transaction Mode
Hierarchy Market
iVon-Relational
(Williamson, 1975) (Williamson, 1975)
Internal External
Transaction Arena
were motivated by rational self-interest rather than mutuality and sentiment, The concept of
community is relevant to the extraorganizational clan because the two share similar purposes
and motivations, except that the latter realizes these aspirations in a firm-specific context.
Integration of the literature on clans and communities therefore suggests the following
definition for the extraorganizational clan:
An extraorganizational clan is a firm-specific network of informal extra-
organizational relationships that result Pom the past and ongoing panern of
interactions between a firm and its members wiih its external social environment.
Freeman's (1984) work on stakeholder theory suggests that the extraorganizational clan
encompasses a wide and diverse array of external relationships that includes suppliers,
regulators, competitors and customers. While this range of stakeholding groups may be
inherent in the nature of the previous definition, it should be noted that the primary focus of
this study is on the extraorganizational clan relationships that a firm proactively develops
between itself and its customers. These theoretical perspectives also suggest the possibility of
observable performance differences existing between those small firms that proactively
engage in extraorganizational clan-building and those that do not. By recognizing and
addressing the relational potential of the transacting experience the small firm is able to
realize superior performance. Therefore, our study's central hypothesis:
Extraorganizational clan-building is positively related with small firm performance.
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METHODOLOGY
Industry Selection
The retail hardware industry (S.I.C.5251) was selected for this study for two reasons: first,
because of the fragmented nature of the industry (Miller, 1992); second, because of entry of
several giant firms into this industry (Ehrenfeld, 1995); and third, because of a demonstrated
tendency for small firms to get involved in the local community context (Thompson, et. al.,
1993).
Instrument Development, Data Collection and Response Rates
We contacted 1,169 small hardware stores in seven major U.S. metropolitan areas (including
Atlanta, Miami, Long island, San Diego, Chicago, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Kansas City).
After participating in a short qualifying telephone interview, respondents completed a mail-
administered survey that had been pre-tested and validated on a sample of Canadian hardware
stores. The survey was designed in accordance with Dillman's Total Design Method
(Dillman, 1978). Of the total sample of 1,169stores, 340 (29.1%)were inaccessible (i.e., they
had either ceased operations or were unavailable to answer the initial telephone call); 62
(5,3%) were incorrectly categorized as retail hardware stores; 110 (9.4%) were in operation
and correctly classified as retail hardware stores but nonetheless refused to participate in the
study. Of the 677 that were correctly classified as retail hardware stores, 370 (31.65%of the
total sample) agreed to cooperate but failed to follow through by returning their completed
survey, while 307 (26.3% of the total sample) followed through by sending back their
completed surveys. In terms of the toial sample, the 307 respondents represented a response
rate of 26.3%; in terms of the 787 stores eligible to participate in the study, the 307
represented a 39.0%participation rate; in terms of the 677 stores that agreed to participate in
the study, the 307 responses represented a response rate of 45.3%.
Dependent Variable: Operationalizing Small Firm Performance
Given the predominant focus on sales volume, the retail productivity measure of sales per
square foot (Mason, Mayer & Ezell, 1988) was chosen as the dependent variable measure. To
compute sales per square foot 1994 sales was divided by the store's inside selling space using
scaled data. Scales on both measures were developed with the assistance of a Cotter True
Value Canada retailing industry expert. Since exact sales and store square footage were only
approximated from scaled responses the resulting distribution's skewness was exacerbated. In
an effort to more closely approximate a normal distribution, we employed a logarithmic
transformation (Glass & Hopkins, 1984).
Independent Variable: Operationalizing Extraorganizational Clan-Building.
Building on insights gained during the exploratory interviews, and subsequently refined
during the pretest, the extraorganizational clan-building construct was operationalized in two
basic ways that included both transacting behaviors and community involvements (Figure 2).
Transacting behaviors: Pre-, intra-, post- and extra-transactional. The first major
operationalization of extraorganizational clan-building focused on different aspects of sale
transacting. These aspects included behaviors before, during, and alter regular transacting
which encouraged firm-specific relational allegiance. In addition, given the "beyond the call
of normal duty" nature of extraorganizational clan building, operationalization also considered
extra-transactional behaviors, that is, behaviors occurring outside normal business hours (a
full listing of all 14 items is found in Table I). A1114 items, representing pre- (3 items), intra-
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(5 items), post- (3 items), and extra-transactional (3 items) behaviors, employed a five point
Likert scale; a score of one meant the behavior never occurred, while a score of five meant the
behavior always occurred, given appropriate opportunity. In an effort to reduce the 14 items
into a more parsimonious offering, factor analysis was utilized. In keeping with the advice of
Kleinbaum, Kupper and Muller (1988) several different rotational techniques were considered
in attempting to minimize factor misfit. Quartimax rotation was eventually selected as the
most appropriate method of rotation given this technique's tendency to encourage individual
items to load mainly on one factor (Stevens, 1992). Using the criterion of eigenvalues of at
least one (Kaiser, 1960), three factors were identified (Table 1). Inclusion of individual items
in a particular factor required the item to satisfy Guadagnoli and Velicer's (1988) loading
criterion of .60 (excepting Item 1 in Factor 3 which loaded at .590). The three factors
(accounting for 21.8%, 13.5%and 9.8%, respectively) together explained 45.1%of the
items'otal
variance.
FIGURE 2: OPERATIONALIZING EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CLAN-BUILDING:
TRANSACTIONAL BEHAVIORS 41 EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS
Fxtraorganizational clan-building
through transacting behaviors
I. pre-transactional
2. intra-transactional
3. post-transactional
4. extra-transactional
Extraorganizational
Extraorganizational clan-building Clan Formation
through extraorganizational
involvements
l. local networks
2. local volunteerism
3. local philanthropy
Community involvements: Networks, volunteerism, snd philanthropy. A second major
operational ization of extraorganizational clan-building focused on extraorganizational
behaviors undertaken by the firm's members that encouraged the formation of relational ties
between the firm and its surrounding community. As Figure 2 shows, operationalization
included three dilYerent extraorganizational behaviors. These included involvement in local
networks, such as business (such as the local Chamber of Commerce) and service (Kiwanis,
Rotary and Lions) associations, and local philanthropies (Thompson, et. aL, 1993) such as
charitable (United Way), youth (Community Clubs and sport teams), and religious (church
auctions) groups. A final operationalization of the extraorganizational clan-building construct
involved local volunteerism with each respondent being asked to estimate the average number
of hours spent during an average week on community involvements. Respondents were asked
to estimate their store's degree of involvement in each of the five areas using a five point
Likert scale; a score of one represented no involvement whatsoever and a score of five
represented high involvement. Scores out of five were summed across the five areas to
generate each respondent's score out of a maximum of 25.
Integrating the extraorganizational clan-building operationslizstions. In the interests of
parsimony, a principle components analysis was carried out of the five sub-operationalizations
of extraorganizational clan-building (i.e., the three transactional factor scores, the
network/philanthropy involvement score, and the number of hours spent each week on
7
Journal ofSmall Business Slraregy Vol. Ii, No. i Spring/Summer 2000
community involvements). By combining the factor loadings (of 0.694 for the Extra-
transactional factor, 0.270 for the Post-transactional factor score, 0.398 for the Pre-
transactional factor score, 0.709 for the average number of hours spent per week on
community work, and 0.699 for the community involvement score) we generated s single
score for each respondent in the extraorganizationsl clan-building niche dimension.
TABLE I: EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CLAN-BUILDING BEHAVIORS:
QUARTI MAX FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 14 PRE-, INTRA-, POST-
AND EXTRA-TRANSACTIONAL BEHAVIORS
Factor I: Factor 2: Factor 3:
Extra- Post- Pre-
Varisble transactional transactional transactional
behaviors behaviors behaviors
Open the store up in the middle of the night in 0.831 0.006 0 052
order to help customers with an emergency
(Farra-trnnssctionni)
Give out your orna phone number to customers 0.710 -0.006 0.121
just in case they hnve an oner hours emergency
(Extra-trnnsncfionnl)
Loan customers produas to try out before they 0.707 0.115 -0.034
buy them so they get exactly what they need
(Intra-trnnsnctionnl)
keep the store open past oAicisl store hours to 0.613 0.)89 0.162
help out customers (Extra-transnational)
Let customers rent equipment without putting 0.580 0.143 0.010
down s deposit (/nira-transactional)
Take back products even if they'e opened (Pari- 0.182 0.868 0.009
trnnssctionnl)
Toke back products even if they'e used (Pasi- 0.156 0.696 -0.147
trnnsnctionsl)
Take back products even if customers don't have 0.238 0.69$ 0.056
s receipt (Parr-trnnssctionnl)
Txy to develop friendships with customers while 0.086 0.033 0.699
they'rc shopping in the store (Pre-transactional)
Mnke it s pnority to be around the store dunng 0.059 -0.031 0.672
regular hours in order to get to know customers
(Pre-trsnssclionsl)
Greet your customers by name ss they enter the 0.212 -0.102 0.590
store (Pre-transactional)
Hold merchandise for longer-then-norms! lengths 0.366 0.142 0.106
of time (/nira-trsnssctionnl)
Extend credit to customers because ofhow well 0.363 0.145 0.097
you know them (Intra-transactional)
place spemsl orders for customers without 0.456 0.210 -0.006
requiring deposits from them (Intra-transactional)
Environmental Control Variables:
Customer Affluence, Competitive Density, Residence Age
We also incorporated three external environmental control variables in our design. In
recognition of the dimension of environmental munificence (Castrogiovanni, )99l) we
included measures for both customer affluence (operstionalized as median per capita income)
and competitor density (operationalized as number of retail competitors identifying
themselves under the md2" S.I.C.category). In respect of potential industry-specific effects
related to neighborhood age, we also controlled for average house age. To define each
respondents'elevant geographic domain, we asked all respondents (during the qualifying
telephone interview) to identify the zip codes accounting for the critical mass of their
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establishment's trading area. We then integrated data for each of the zip codes from the most
recent U.S. Census on each of the three dimensions to generate weighted values, with each zip
code area weighted by its respective population.
Organizational Control Variables: Firm Size and Customer Service
In an effort to account for the possibility of different internal factors influencing the
respondent's operations, two key intra-organizational dimensions were also controlled for.
The first, firm size, was predicated on Aldrich and Auster's (1990)observation of size being a
significant predictor of organizational strategy and performance. While the operationalization
of size has included a variety of measures, including natural logarithm of sales, net assets, and
number of employees in the organization (Singh, 1986), for the purposes of this study size
was operationalized as the standardized log of each store's square footage (using scaled data).
This selection was motivated by three considerations: the basic validity of square footage as a
size control (Mason, Meyer, & Ezell, 1988), data collection limitations, and minimization of
multicollinearity (Pedhazur, 1982). Regression diagnostics were carried out in order to assess
whether the size measure's correlation with the dependent variable was problematic; no
multicollinearity problem was observed.
In an effort to establish the discriminant validity of the extraorganizational clan-building
construct from the more generic construct of "customer service," twenty-two items from the
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Barry (1988) SERVQUAL survey instrument were included in the
survey. Reverse-scored items were reconverted by subtracting the reported score from eight.
All twenty-two items were then summed and averaged for a mean customer service score.
While direct customer involvement in the measurement process would have increased the
measure's validity (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1985; Parasuraman, et. al., 1988; Nel &
Pitt, 1993), resource limitations constrained the choice of data providers to only include store
owner/managers.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A summary matrix of the correlation coefficients of the variable set is found in Table 2. Our
study's hypothesis proposed that extraorganizational clan-building was positively related to
firm performance. Table 3 presents results from multiple regression models testing this
assertion. In terms of descriptive statistics, respondents'ean 1994 sales were approximately
$900,000. The mean establishment age was just under 38 years. Three models form the crux
of our analysis; Model I reports the results of our basic model including control variables
only; Model 2 adds the aggregated extraorganizational clan-building factor score; Model 3,
utilizes the factor score's disaggregated data (that is, the three transactional factor scores, the
number of hours spent per week on community involvements, and the community
involvement score).
Our flrst model shows sales per square foot being positively related to resident affluence and
competitive density. This suggests that small firm performance is influenced by environment;
However, a finer-grained examination tells a somewhat different story. As Model 3 shows,
further investigation of the role of the strategy's composite parts shows all five of the
elements achieving statistical significance, albeit in two distinct patterns. Two of the three
transaction factor scores (the extra-transactional and pre-transactional factors) and one of the
extraorganizational involvement variables (number of hours spent each week on community
involvements) were negatively related to firm performance, while the other two elements
(post-transactional factor and total community involvement score) were positive predictors of
firm performance.
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
(PROBABILITIES) OF PERFORMANCE, EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL
CLAN-BUILDING FACTOR SCORE, AND SUB-COMPONENTS
( I) Dl D l l4[ Vl (6) Dl
Mean Perfor- Extraorg. Extra- Post- Pre- Comm. Comm.
(s.d.) mance clan score trans. Trans, trans, hours involve
I I ( Perfurmance 0.205 1.0
(0 162) (')
(2[ Extraorganizationai 20.553 -0.088 1.0
clan-building score (6.455) (.1673) (~)
[3[ Extra-transactional) 7.278 -0.099 0.569 1.0
(2.880) (.0856) (&.0001) (~)
[4] Post. transactional) 7.875 0.039 0.173 0.271 1.0
(2.082) (.5043) (.0055) (&.0001) ( )
[5[Pre-transactional) 7.592 -0.084 0.235 0.216 -0.024 I 0
(1.424) (.1476) (.0001) (.0001) (.6744) ( )
[6 Community hours 3.310 -0.055 0.812 0.190 0.021 0.098 1,0
(4 790) (3621) (&.0001) (.0014) (.7282) (.1043) ( )
(7[ Community 11.610 0.011 0.774 0.228 0.022 0.069 0.443 1.0
involvements (4 411) (.8518) (& 0001) .0001 (.7085) (2486) (& 0001) ( )
What might these findings mean? At the very least, they provide support, albeit limited, for
our hypothesis. The bifurcated pattern of predictors also suggests that all forms of
extraorganizational clan-building should not be seen as equally beneficial. Indeed,
undiscerning and unfocused actions appear a rather unwise use of the scarce resource of
management time. Rather, effective extraorganizational clan-building appears to involve
focusing on those aspects of clan-building that do not detract from the core activities of the
firm. This is suggested by the distinction between indirect, behind the-counter, versus direct,
outside-the-store involvement; the former permits store managers to connect with their
respective communities while remaining engaged in their firm's core activities, while the
latter require an explicit tradeoff.
A second assertion is also hinted at in these results. Extraorganizational clan-building's
linkage to performance may be most readily observed in those transactional behaviors that are
most trust-intensive. This is apparent from the post-transactional factor score's positive test
result. Given our earlier definition of the extraorganizational clan as "a firm-specific network
of informal extra-organizational relationships that result from the pass and ongoing pattern of
interactions," giving customers the benefit of the doubt through a generous and unquestioning
return policy may be an important and necessary route to encouraging their practice of social
reciprocity (Gouldner, I 960).
CONCLUSION: IF YOU KNOW THEM, THEY WILL COME
The small firm must find some way to compete that alleviates its chronic condition of
resource impoverishment (Welsh & White, l98(). Building on work in institutional
legitimacy, we have argued that one strategy small firms can pursue is to develop deep and
enduring clan-like linkages with customers. Our study offers preliminary support for this
assertion with managers reporting selected efforts to foster and nurture customer friendship as
enhancing their respective establishments'rospects for survival.
(0
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR
EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CLAN-BUILDING
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SALES PER SQUARE FOOT
(Standardized Betas Reported with T-Ratio)
Model I Model 2 Model 3
Control variables:
Store size -0.416 -0.431 -0.490(-7.483"') (-7.165ass) (-7.988"v")
Customer service 0.004 0.046 0.057
(0.075) (0.790) (0.993)
Affluence 0.145 0.126 0.083
(2.574&) (2.042s) (1.327)
House age -0.002 0.048 0.071
(-0.041) (0.748) (1.145)
Competition 0.091 0.133 0.097
(1.697t) (2.271&) (1.687t)
Independent variables:
Extraorgaoizatiooal clan-building
-0.083
(-1.411)
Extra-transactional Factor
-0.143
(-2.262&)
Post-transactional Factor 0.098
(1.654t)
Pre-transactional Factor
-0.100
(-1.661t)
Number of hours spent per week on -0.168
community work (-2.537')
Total community involvement score 0.175
(2.688s s)
Constant -0.408 -0.394 -0.268
(-1.726'v') (-1.529) (-1.017)
R 0.188 0.216 0.272
Adjusted R 0.174 0.196 0.241
df 288 238 234
F 13 3Ptuv 10.91'u'.731s's
t p &.10 sp& (15 v' &.01 us ~ p & Pot
However, notwithstanding our study's results, several caveats warrant mention. A first
limitation concerns our exclusive reliance on store managers. Due to methodological
limitations, we were unable to include customer input to validate the extent to which the
transactional behaviors actually occurred. Likewise, no community social agencies were
solicited on respondents'ctual involvements. Clearly, an important next step could involve
expanding the circle of data points to include a more diverse set of stakeholders. Likewise, in
consideration of Parsons'onceptualization of the technical, managerial and institutional
dimensions of organization, additional work could explore the extent to which relational
initiatives demonstrate an interactive effect with either technical and managerial actions.
In summary, small firms are fundamentally disadvantaged when competing against large
competitors. However, the large competitor is not without its own Achilles'eel. One point
of apparent vulnerability arises from scale-oriented operations often being accompanied by
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increasingly impersonal transacting behaviors. To reverse paraphrase Welsh and White
(1981), while "a small business is not a little big business," neither is a large business a big
small business. And at exactly this point a relational opportunity emerges for the alert small
firm. By deliberately enriching its transactions with a relational overlay, small firms can
foster personalized loyalty largely inaccessible to scale-advantaged players. While large firms
may, as Schnoor's opening statement observed, attempt to instill a superficial veneer of
friendly service as "a friendly neighborhood store where the workers know the
customers'ames"
the reality remains otherwise.
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